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Derrida and Political Resistance: The Radical Potential of Deconstruction 




This paper begins from the claim that the currently dominant approaches to the study of political 
resistance in global politics, namely the (Neo-)Gramscian and Foucauldian traditions, suffer from a 
common problem in that the forms of resistance they conceptualise are highly susceptible to 
appropriation by, or reinscription within, prevailing forms of global ordering. In an attempt to 
respond to this shortcoming, or, more properly, to explore how this reinscription of resistance might 
itself be resisted, the paper offers an account of political resistance developed using the thought of 
Jacques Derrida. Having established the parallel between the way in which prevailing relations of 
sovereign power and governmental ordering all too quickly co-opt and engulf resistance, and the 
way in which metaphysics calls thought back to order and tends towards onto-political totalisation, it 
is argued that by means of a deconstructive approach, acts of resistance may be further radicalised 
by adding to them second- and third-order onto-political critiques—namely of the resistance-act 
itself and the agent or actor of resistance herself. The core claim made is that inasmuch as 
deconstruction attempts to interrupt forms of thinking and knowing right up to and including 
processes of conscious and unconscious subjectification, it can provide valuable means by which the 
micro-gestures of onto-politics can be resisted at the (fundamentally interrelated) levels of political 
thought and concrete praxis. 
 
Introduction 
The study of political resistance in the field of global politics has expanded and diversified over the 
last decade; the escalation of global dissent and protest activities, from the Arab uprisings to the 
Occupy movements, to ongoing struggles against the neo-liberalisation of higher education and the 
privatisation of public sector institutions, has injected renewed energy into academic research on 
the topic. In the Anglophone literature, the emergent scholarship has fallen broadly into two main 
traditions, namely a (Neo-)Gramscian approach and a Foucault-inspired orientation. These divergent 
approaches suffer, however, from a common problem in that the forms of resistance they 
conceptualise are highly susceptible to appropriation by, or reinscription within, prevailing forms of 
global ordering. In particular, existing accounts of the subject or agent of resistance, whether framed 
in terms of Gramscian counter-hegemonic social movements or the Foucauldian practitioner of 
counter-conduct, frequently fall prey to enacting unwitting reproductions of precisely the forms of 
both macro and micro-disciplinary processes of ordering they seek to resist. As Lara Montesinos 
Coleman and Karen Tucker note, ‘governmental power may be exercised and the status quo 
stabilised in and through even the most grassroots or subaltern practices of contestation’ (2011, p. 
401). More forcefully put, in Judith Butler's words, one may believe that one is resisting, for instance, 
Fascism, ‘only to find that the identificatory source of one's own opposition is Fascism itself, and that 
Fascism depends essentially on the kind of resistance one offers’ (2000, p. 173).1 
In an attempt to respond to this problem of the reappropriation of resistance back into the folds of 
global ordering, or, more properly, how this reinscription might itself be resisted, this paper builds 
upon the existing critical literature by offering a conceptualisation of political resistance and its 
agents or subjects utilising the thought of Jacques Derrida. The argument made begins from 
Derrida's claim that politics and metaphysics are fundamentally interrelated; the paper shows that a 
parallel may be drawn between the way in which prevailing relations of sovereign power and 
governmental ordering all too quickly co-opt and engulf resistance, and the way in which 
metaphysics calls thought back to order and tends towards onto-political totalisation. Both political 
and metaphysical ordering, it is suggested, operate through a cumulative plethora of micro-
disciplinary gestures, sometimes clearly, but often imperceptibly, closing down avenues of thought 
and steering potentially disruptive action back towards the status quo. Accordingly, resistance to 
such ordering processes must meet both these obvious and barely visible but endless series of 
cooptations as they occur, pulling, in a variety of different directions, away from the appropriation of 
thought and action back into the same. It is here that a deconstructive approach to resistance has 
purchase; insofar as the ceaseless movements of deconstruction seek to knock relentless processes 
of ontologisation off course, they endeavour to interrupt and thereby resist such intricate processes 
of conceptual consolidation. 
Consequently, while not claiming that such a formulation can finally avoid or resolve this complex 
problem, it is suggested that Derrida's thought provides means by which acts of resistance may be 
further radicalised, as they are conceived of and enacted, by adding to them second- and third-order 
onto-political critiques—namely of the resistance-act itself and the agent or actor of resistance 
herself—intended to pull away from such ontologisation. The paper argues that such second- and 
third-order critiques can have at least three politically radical consequences: an insistence on the 
limitlessness of responsibility which takes seriously the urgency of the political; the politicisation of 
intervention precisely as a consequence of its ultimate indefensibility; and the self-conscious 
attempt of the subject to interrogate and thereby endeavour to (re)write herself in light of the 
aforementioned. It thus proposes a different kind of subject of resistance to Gramscian counter-
hegemonic movements and the Foucauldian practitioner of counter-conduct, that is, an auto-
deconstructionist actor committed to viewing her own subjecthood, as well as her concrete 
interventions,2 as a site of political struggle. 
The paper begins by providing a brief overview of the prevailing Gramscian and Foucauldian 
approaches to the study of resistance, specifically as regards their respective framings of the subject 
or agent of resistance. Having provided this contextualisation, the discussion then turns to 
developing an account of the ways in which deconstruction provides salient means by which a form 
of resistance more resistant to its cooptation into forms of global ordering might function, drawing 
directly from Derrida's texts as well as from the work of scholars who utilise his thought. The paper 
finally turns to the crucial question of the concrete consequences of such a deconstructive mode of 
political resistance; countering the well-rehearsed charges that deconstruction is of significance only 
at the level of the philosophical or metaphysical (a claim which vastly underestimates the degree to 
which theory and practice—thought and action—are profoundly intertwined), a discussion of some 
of the substantive praxiological implications of deconstruction at the level of concrete intervention is 
provided via a brief engagement with feminist, queer, and post-colonial political sites. The core claim 
made in the paper is that inasmuch as deconstruction attempts to interrupt forms of thinking and 
knowing right up to and including processes of conscious and unconscious subjectification, it can 
provide valuable means by which the micro-gestures of onto-politics can be resisted at the 
(fundamentally interrelated) levels of both thought and concrete praxis. Challenging the limitations 
of both a Gramscian and Foucauldian reading of the subject or agent of resistance, it is argued that 
deconstruction can help one conceptualise modes of subject-becoming and political intervention 
which both take seriously their own indefensibility and violence in the context of a post-foundational 
political landscape and insist upon active and interventionary, if ultimately indefensible and 
therefore explicitly politicised, forms of radical praxis. 
 
Conceptualising Deconstruction as a form of Political Resistance 
Amongst other differences, what divides the prevailing Gramscian and Foucauldian approaches to 
the study of resistance in global politics is their respective accounts of the subject of resistance, the 
persons or groups conceptualised as the agents of dissent. The former, Catherine Eschle and Bice 
Maiguashca suggest, has proceeded by ‘[d]eploying the concept of “social movements” or “forces” 
and situating them in the realm of “civil society”'. These actors, they continue, are characterised as 
‘counter-hegemonic' to the extent that they reflect a collective will and seek to overturn 
class forms of oppression. We suggest that, for Gramscians, such movements embody 
alliances of diverse forces which transcend different ways of being and understanding, unite 
distinct realms of subjectivity around the interests of subordinated classes and reflect 
shared truths and goals. (2007, p. 292) 
In Gramscian approaches, in other words, the subject of resistance is presented as more or less 
united collective social and political groupings, which intervene to pursue their interests in the 
political sphere. 
This conceptualisation of the subject of dissent has been challenged by, amongst others, James C. 
Scott in his articulation of infrapolitical resistances ‘which fall short of openly declared contestation’ 
(Mittleman & Chin, 2005, p. 22), Roland Bleiker via his examination of ‘networks of anti-discipline’ 
and ‘everyday forms of resistance’ (2000, p. 200) and anarchist-inspired engagements with a range 
of contemporary resistance movements (Day, 2004; Rossdale, 2010). Similarly, scholars drawing 
explicitly on Foucault, Eschle and Maiguashca suggest, have voiced suspicion of the ‘erasures 
entailed in narratives of identity and unity', emphasising instead ‘the transitory and contingent 
nature of activist politics', and ‘eschew[ing] the term ‘social movement' in favour of concepts seen as 
less homogenising'. Importantly, they note, from such a Foucauldian vantage point, ‘there is no 
unified subject performing acts of resistance; rather resistance acts are constitutive of an always 
incomplete subject’ (2007, p. 292). At stake in this debate is the question of the complexities and 
complicities of the subject or agent of resistance; the Gramscian framing of an oppositional relation 
of hegemonic and counter-hegemonic forces both homogenises actors within resistance movements 
and underestimates the implications of their embeddedness within power relations. While it concurs 
with this Foucauldian critique, this paper suggests that a turn to Derrida's thought can provide 
avenues which help resist the reinscription of resistance back into forms of global ordering which the 
former cannot. 
Derrida's thought enjoys considerable influence in the critical literature within the discipline of 
Global Politics. The many ways in which it is of significance for the study of the political have been 
elucidated at length by, amongst others, Arfi (2012), Bulley (2009, 2007, pp. 128–142), Campbell 
(1998a, 1998b), Dillon (2007, pp. 80–96, 2010, pp. 191–207, 2013), Edkins (1999, pp. 65–86, 2007, 
pp. 172–192), Fagan (2013), Hirst (2013a, pp. 120–197, 2013b), O'Callaghan (2012), Pinkerton 
(2012), Vaughan-Williams (2007), and Zehfuss (2002, pp. 196–249, 2007, pp. 97–111, 2009). It is not, 
accordingly, the intention of this paper to set out an extensive overview of the fundamentals of 
deconstruction or Derrida's oeuvre more broadly. Instead, the aim here is to respond to the specific 
problem of the reappropriation of resistance back into the folds of global ordering, or, more 
properly, to demonstrate how this reinscription of resistance might itself be resisted, utilising 
elements of Derrida's thought. 
The question of such reinscription has played a central role in the ongoing debates which ensued 
following the events of 1968 between leftist movements of various denominations, both within and 
beyond the academy. Deconstruction has been widely criticised in these exchanges, not least for its 
apparent failure to provide a concrete platform from which an actor or agent may enact political 
interventions; the charge levelled has been that in undermining the political, ethical, and ontological 
foundations assumed to be necessary for radical intervention, deconstruction leads to 
immobilisation, acquiescence to the status quo, and/or relativism and nihilism. Pragmatists like 
Richard Rorty, for instance, have argued that deconstruction has 
done little for leftist politics. On the contrary, by diverting attention from real politics, it has 
helped create a self-satisfied and insular academic left which—like the left of the 1960s—
prides itself on not being co-opted by the system and thereby renders itself less able to 
improve the system. (1996, p.15) 
Similarly, many associated with the Marxian tradition, such as Terry Eagleton, have accused 
practitioners of deconstruction of indulging in a form of bourgeois jouissance in which ‘political 
quietism and compromise are preserved’ as a consequence of ‘a dispersal of the subject so radical as 
to render it impotent as any kind of agent at all, least of all a revolutionary one’ (1981, pp. 137–138). 
In such readings, deconstruction quickly slips back into propping up the status quo by removing any 
defensible platform from which to enact resistance. 
Eagleton's critique provides, however, a useful platform from which to begin to elucidate an 
alternative account of deconstruction in which it can be viewed as having purchase in the context of 
political resistance. On the one hand, deconstruction can, he argues, be read as an 
extraordinarily modest proposal: a sort of patient, probing reformism of the text, which is 
not, so to speak, to be confronted over the barricades but cunningly waylaid in the corridors 
and suavely chivvied into revealing its ideological hand. Stoically convinced of the 
unbreakable grip of metaphysical closure, the deconstructionist, like any responsible trade 
union bureaucrat confronting management, must settle for that and negotiate what he or 
she can within the left-overs and stray contingencies casually unabsorbed by the textual 
power system. (1981, p. 134) 
In this reading, deconstruction's interventionary potential is limited in advance because the 
metaphysical structures and strictures characteristic of Western political thought and praxis leave 
only the possibility of surface-level reform. Deriving from and reproducing the ‘blend of euphoria 
and disillusionment, liberation and dissipation, carnival and catastrophe, which was 1968’, post-
structuralism in general, according to Eagleton, found itself unable to ‘break the structures of state 
power’, and turned instead to the task of ‘subverting the structures of language’ (1996, p. 123). 
What ensues in the case of deconstruction in particular, he claims, is that ‘the Maoist “cultural 
revolution” is naively transplanted to the arena of language, so that political revolution becomes 
implicitly equated with some ceaseless disruption and overturning’ (1991, p. 197). The ultimate 
consequence of this is a process of emptying out of both the subject and object of political thought; 
Anglo-American deconstruction amounts, for Eagleton, to ‘a power game, a mirror-image of 
orthodox academic competition. It is just that now … victory is achieved by kenosis or self-emptying: 
the winner is the one who has managed to get rid of all his cards and sit with empty hands’ (1996, p. 
127). The implication of this is that deconstruction ‘practices a mode of self-destruction that leaves it 
as invulnerable as an empty page. As such, it merely rehearses in different terms a gesture common 
to all ideology: it attempts to vanquish its antagonist while leaving itself unscathed’ (1981, p. 136). 
Such a process offers little by way of politicised intervention. 
On the other hand, however, Eagleton suggests that to frame it as such 
ignores the other fact of deconstruction which is its hair-raising radicalism – the nerve and 
daring with which it knocks the stuffing out of every smug concept and leaves the well-
groomed text shamefully dishevelled. It ignores, in short, the madness and violence of 
deconstruction, its scandalous urge to think the unthinkable, the flamboyance with which it 
poses itself on the very brink of meaning and dances there, pounding away at the crumbling 
cliff-edge beneath its feet and prepared to fall with it into the sea of unlimited semiosis or 
schizophrenia. (1981, p. 134, emphases in original) 
Such an intervention is, for Eagleton, ‘ultra-leftist’; because ‘texts’, understood as both written 
artefacts and concrete socio-political configurations, are ‘power systems’, the deconstructionist 
‘must track a cat-and-mouse game within and across them without ever settling for either signifier 
or signified’ (1981, p. 134). In this reading, deconstruction's radicalism consists in its capacity to 
substantively and tirelessly interrupt prevailing conceptual and praxiological modes of operating. In 
Derrida's words, the effect of this is to instigate ‘the subversion of every kingdom. Which makes it 
obviously threatening and infallibly dreaded by everything within us that desires a kingdom’ (cited in 
Bowman, 2010, p. 39). Amongst other things, what such a response poses is the question of what it 
is in ‘us’ that seeks such a stable or defensible platform from which to enact political intervention. 
What is interesting about this dual framing is that it points to the possibility, on the one hand, that 
deconstruction, read as the continuous reflection upon, and evaluation of, norms, assumptions, and 
principles, is not really a big ask; any critical position worthy of the name should be engaging in 
reflexive auto-critique as a matter of course in order to respond to its inevitable shortcomings, 
exclusions, and oversights. On the other hand, the radicalism of deconstruction, Eagleton shows, 
consists in the scope, depth, and endurance of such auto-critique. Far from simply an isolated 
instance or contained process, deconstruction is interminable, never ceasing, and insists that no 
claim, assumption, or principle is to be viewed as given or unproblematic, no matter how apparently 
praiseworthy. Even as political interventions are conceptualised and performed, a deconstructive 
engagement insists upon reflecting again, challenging again the grounds upon which an action was 
taken, and making any certitude of one's correctness ultimately impossible. As will be shown below, 
however, the absence of such ‘correctness’ is in many ways a salutary, as opposed to debilitating, 
political moment. 
This raises a second important question, namely that of the animating drive or momentum of 
deconstruction; if the grounds upon which one can base a political intervention have been 
fundamentally shaken, it is legitimate to ask what is it that animates deconstruction's ceaseless 
movements. On the one hand, both Derrida and many utilising his thought suggest that 
deconstruction can be described as always already in motion due to its relation to an 
undeconstructable otherness to which one is always already responsible: ‘Once you relate to the 
other as the other, then something incalculable comes on the scene… That is what gives 
deconstruction its movement’ (2006, pp. 17–18). Derrida frames this as springing from a relation to 
justice: ‘Justice is what gives us the impulse, the drive, or the movement to improve the law, that is, 
to deconstruct the law’ (2006, p. 16). In other words, deconstruction finds ‘its “force, its movement 
or its motivation” in the “always unsatisfied appeal” to justice’ (Bowman, 2010, pp. 43–44, citing 
Protevi). Such momentum is similarly framed by John Caputo in terms of a faith (2006, p. 165), or a 
‘nameless love' (2006, p. 173). The imperative that emanates from this relation to otherness is, 
Derrida suggests elsewhere, so significant that no other authoring force of deconstruction is 
necessary: ‘the insistence on unbinding…, on the irreducibility of difference is so massive as to need 
no further insistence’ (1998, p. 27). The aporia underpinning deconstruction, he argues, ‘is just what 
impels deconstruction, what rouses it out of bed in the morning, what drives it on and calls it into 
action’ (2006, p. 32). 
Whether framed as emanating from an always unsatisfied appeal to justice, faith, love, or aporia, 
what these accounts share is the sense that deconstruction ‘happens’ as a consequence of the 
relation to otherness, that the authorising force ‘is’ this relation. This is, perhaps, the deconstruction 
of the ‘to come’, the deconstruction associated with the messianic promise made most explicit in 
Derrida's later work; in Caputo's framing, the ‘import and the impulse, the drive and desire of 
deconstruction is not cognitive or constative but performative; deconstruction is not matter of 
knowing or seeing, but of believing…[,] driven by a faith in the impossible and undeconstructible’ 
(2006, p. 166). 
In contrast to this, on the other hand, Derrida and numerous scholars employing his ideas frame 
deconstruction as requiring a more explicit and deliberate intervention on the part of an actor or 
subject. In Bowman's framing, deconstruction ‘has no power of its own’ (2010, p. 38). Derrida 
similarly states that far from simply ‘happening’, deconstruction must be enacted: ‘deconstruction is 
“yes”, is linked to the “yes”, is an affirmation’ (cited in Caputo, 2006, p. 27).3 As such, an active 
effort on the part of an agent is assumed; rather than springing solely from a relation to otherness, 
deconstruction is an interventionary process requiring constant work. Far from it occurring 
spontaneously as a consequence of the relation to otherness, one must try to find, for instance, the 
heterogeneity in texts (Derrida, 2006, p. 9). This necessitates an ‘incessant vigilance about the doors 
that are constantly being shut by the “possible”’ (Caputo, 2006, p. 134); as such it relies on an 
endless series of interventions on the part of an actor, a ceaseless resistance to the ever-present 
appropriations of the onto-political. 
This is crucial in the context of resistance because it is precisely the commitment made on the part 
of the subject which makes possible the resistances deconstruction pertains to. To rely on the 
assumption that deconstruction simply ‘happens’ within the text, occurs spontaneously as a 
consequence of a relation to otherness, profoundly underestimates the struggle required to attempt 
to ceaselessly resist the micro-disciplinary ensnarements of the onto-political at intertwined levels of 
thought and the concrete political sphere. It further underemphasises the degree to which 
deconstruction is itself a violent and even fraught enterprise: in Derrida's words, deconstruction 
involves a ‘sufferance': ‘what makes it suffer and what makes those it torments suffer is perhaps the 
absence of rules, of norms, of definitive criteria that would allow one to distinguish unequivocally 
between droit and justice’ (1992, p. 4). 
I would argue that this latter reading of deconstruction as interwoven with struggle, experienced 
through the violence of the indefensible, is of much greater value in the context of conceptualising 
resistance than is the former messianic vision; as I and others have argued elsewhere (Hirst, 2013b; 
Houseman, 2013), insofar as the ‘death of God’4 precludes the possibility of an authoring ‘Alter’, and 
the horrors of Auschwitz and countless past and contemporary political violences situate the beatific 
hopefulness of the messianic promise beyond the bounds even of irony, such a promise is 
problematic at best. It may be that such a messianic framing of deconstruction informs Eagleton's 
important challenge that, ‘in a world groaning in agony, where the very future of humankind hangs 
by a hair, there is something objectionably luxurious about deconstruction’ (1981, p. 140). Simply 
put, one cannot wait for deconstruction to simply unfold before one's eyes; the urgency of the 
political demands an active, even fraught mode of engagement, in which the subject or agent 
proceeds with her own irredeemable violence in the forefront of her account of herself in a bid to 
write and rewrite herself anew in light of the political landscape encountered. Accordingly, the paper 
now turns to Derrida's thought in order to develop an account of how such a deconstructive mode of 
resistance might function. 
 
Derrida and Political Resistance 
While Derrida's oeuvre is vast, explicit references to the concept of resistance are few. The account 
of a deconstructive mode of resistance provided here, accordingly, focuses primarily on the works in 
which the issue is most directly addressed. In Resistances of Psychoanalysis, Derrida begins his 
account of the concept of resistance by marking his love of the signifier: ‘Ever since I can remember, 
I have always loved this word'. He continues: 
This word… resonated in my desire and my imagination as the most beautiful word in the 
politics and history of this country, this word loaded with all the pathos of my nostalgia, as if, 
at any cost, I would like not to have missed blowing up trains, tanks, and headquarters 
between 1940 and 1945… Why have I always dreamed of resistance? (Derrida, 1998, p. 2)5 
Paul Bowman takes up this question of why one might dream of resistance, noting a number of 
potential dangers associated with the concept. He identifies, first, a Žižekian reading in which 
‘“politics” and “resistance” might be regarded as alibis covering a drive to repeat certain gestures 
(such as “politicizing” or “seeking resistance”) rather than anything like an “authentic” desire to 
make a change’ (2010, p. 47. Emphasis in original). Such a drive has more to do with the generation 
of particular forms of jouissance than it does substantive political intervention. 
Bowman similarly notes the pessimism of Baudrillard and Adorno, both of whom might take ‘the 
possibility of an intimate intertwining or wedlock between power and resistance to mean that 
oppositional resistance per se is “always already negated by the structure of the entity which it 
wishes to oppose”’ (2010, p. 48, citing Docherty, 1993, p. 322). It is easy, he continues, to move from 
this position to the conclusion of Bourdieu and Wacquant that ‘the very idea of resistance… is simply 
a fetish concept which demonstrates a profound misrecognition and delusion of the part of those 
who “buy into it”’; in this reading, ‘dreams of resistance are really only resistant dreams. Those 
involved in cultural theory may (claim to) dream of resistance, but that doesn't mean that anything is 
actually being resisted. Claiming to resist is not necessarily to resist’ (2010, p. 49, emphases in 
original). Derrida is, of course, mindful of this: in Bowman's terms, Derrida shows that ‘even 
resistance organised by explicit appeal to the idea of (its own) freedom may not be free or self-
determining and may instead be entirely overdetermined, symptomatic—possibly even more an 
expression of the power that is ostensibly being resisted than something independently resistant or 
alter-native’ (2010, p. 48. Emphasis in original). Nevertheless, Derrida risks elucidating his self-
identified ‘idiomatic’, even ‘idiosyncratic’, interest in the concept of resistance in the context of 
psychoanalytic theory. 
Psychoanalysis, Derrida suggests, can be understood as ‘analysis of resistance’ insofar as the 
manifestations of resistance enacted both consciously and unconsciously by the analysand to the 
treatment offered by the analyst lay bare the limitations of, and violences immanent to, the latter. In 
his exploration of Freud's commentary on the problem of resistance to psychoanalysis, he is 
concerned, in his words, ‘with something other than analysis, a certain analysis, something that, in 
another sense, perhaps, resists analysis, a certain analysis’ (1998, p. 5). Derrida traces this 
‘something other’ through a series of different forms of resistance to psychoanalysis; he shows that 
Freud identified five distinct registers at which resistance operates, which emanate variously from 
the ego, the id, and the superego, but suggests that the most enduring and resilient resistances are 
associated with the repetition compulsion and function at the level of the unconscious (1998, p. 23). 
This ‘something other’ which prompts such resistances is read by Derrida as interrupting 
psychoanalysis's claim to internal coherence, self-sameness, and reasonableness. This is because it 
transpires that the only means by which resistances can be finally overcome are non-rational, 
affective, and emotive; in Andrea Hurst's framing, Freud 
acknowledges that resistances can be nonrational, which means that struggles against them 
have to mobilize forces other than those of rational enlightenment… In other words, to 
persuade analysands to accept interpretations, analysts are required to capitalize on the 
emotional dynamics of a ‘poleros', that is, the polemics and erotics of resistance, power, and 
authority … (2008, p. 172) 
It is this ‘something other’ that connects the notion of resistance to the movements of 
deconstruction. Just as this force sabotages the imposition of order and stability of narrative on the 
part of the analyst in the context of psychoanalysis, so too does the deconstructive imperative resist 
the instantiation of totality in the sphere of the onto-political. Oliver Marchart describes something 
similar in his framing of the distinction between ‘politics', understood as a particular set of 
instantiated socio-political arrangements, and ‘the political’, understood as something other which 
inexorably exceeds and disrupts these forms of ordering as a consequence of the exclusions and 
violences of any configuration of ‘politics’ (2007). 
The nature of this sabotaging ‘something other’ at work in both resistance to psychoanalysis and a 
deconstructive political ethos can be discerned through an elucidation of the relationship between 
Foucault's and Derrida's respective approaches to resistance. For Foucault, as Jenny Edkins and 
Veronique Pin-Fat show, ‘relations of power entail resistance: they would not count as relations of 
power were resistance not present’ (2004, p. 5). As such, resistance is immanent to the structures of 
global order for Foucault in a manner not dissimilar to Derrida's identification of a resistant 
‘something other’ always already at work within psychoanalysis; in both accounts, resistance is 
contained within and always already part of the relational ordering processes at work. 
Similarly, Foucault and Derrida share in certain respects a commitment to genealogy as a mode of 
resistance. According to Roland Bleiker, genealogies ‘trace the processes by which we have come to 
accept our world as natural or meaningful’; they are 
historical investigations into the ideas and events that have shaped our thinking, speaking 
and acting… [They] focus on the process by which we have constructed origins and given 
meaning to particular representations of the past, representations that continuously guide 
our daily lives and set clear limits to political and social options. 
Genealogies thus enact resistance because ‘questions of agency are above all questions of power 
relations. And power relations are best understood, Michel Foucault argues convincingly, by 
examining specific attempts that are made to uproot them’ (2000, pp. 25–26). Differently put, what 
is suggested here is that by conducting a genealogical exploration into specific configurations of 
power relations via an examination of forms of dissent, the political fault lines inherent to such 
relations are exposed and thereby (potentially or actually) challenged. Such forms of counter-writing 
can provide alternative accounts of particular power relations which expose and address the 
hierarchies, silences, and exclusions of prevailing historical and contemporary socio-political 
arrangements, and these can be used to conceptualise interventions intended to resist them. 
Deconstruction shares with Foucauldian genealogy a commitment to such conceptual and concrete 
disturbances: in Derrida's words, deconstruction is ‘always a matter of undoing, desedimenting, 
decomposing, deconstituting sediments, artefacta, presuppositions, institutions'. To this degree, he 
explains, deconstruction may be read as a ‘critico-genealogical return’ (1998, p. 27. Emphases in 
original). Deconstruction, he claims, follows the logic of the dual meaning of the word ‘analysis’: it 
‘undeniably obeys an analytical exigency, at once critical and analytic'. What emerges, he continues, 
is both an ‘archeological or anagogical motif… and the philolytic motif of the dissociative—always 
very close to the saying dis-social—unbinding’ (1998, p. 27. Emphases in original). In other words, 
what Derrida identifies here is the dimension of deconstruction which shares a good deal with 
genealogy's commitment to an excavation and reinterpretation of the past and/or present in a 
manner which intervenes so as to denaturalise dominant social understandings and forces. 
At this stage, however, Derrida appends a footnote which stipulates that ‘the necessity of this 
genealogy must always be complicated by a ‘counter-genealogy'. Simple genealogy always risks 
privileging the archeo-genetic motif, or even the at least symbolic schema of filiation, family, or 
national origin’ (1998, n. 8, p. 120). While I would not use the word ‘simple’ in the context of 
Foucault's genealogical interventions, Derrida's comment highlights a crucial issue at stake in 
processes of counter-writing and counter-conduct. In his words, deconstruction ‘radicalizes at the 
same time its axiomatics and the critique of its axiomatics'. What this entails is ‘a movement of 
deconstruction that is not only counter-archeological but counter-genealogical'. This is because ‘the 
deconstructive necessity drives one to put into question even this principle of self-presence in the 
unity of consciousness', (1998, pp. 27–28. Emphasis in original) upon which the construction of a 
genealogy depends. In other words, through deconstruction, critique extends not only to the object 
or issue prompting the initial genealogical re-writing but also, at the same time, to both any 
alternative story told and, indeed, the author or subject of any such alternative narrative. 
The extension of critique to such second- and third-order sites is necessary because however 
apparently politically laudable the intervention, one cannot engage in a project of genealogical 
counter-writing or counter-conduct without enacting a privileging of a particular subject position 
and, consequently, a necessarily violent rendering of the objects in question. As such, as Paul Patton 
notes, genealogy may thus be read as a ‘first step' in deconstruction (2007, p. 768), but beyond this 
first-order engagement, both the alternative account provided and the agent herself must also be 
put into question. This is because any alternative history or conceptual apparatus as such risks 
becoming its own totalising gesture, one as problematic as the last; the intention is to resist the 
possibility that the critico-genealogical intervention itself becomes consolidated into a new 
prevailing account, as blind as was the last to its own exclusions, hierarchies, and violences. This 
gesture adds, I would submit, a further radical intervention which genealogy alone cannot provide. 
Michael Dillon suggests something similar in his statement that an interrogation of the politics of 
security 
requires something in addition to genealogy as well; because genealogy, however politicising 
it might be – Foucault arguing, powerfully, that this politicising takes place for, or rather 
around, the battle over truth as ‘the ensemble of rules according to which the true and the 
false are separated and specific effects of power attached to the true' – does not directly 
pose and seek to think the question of the political as such. (1996, p. 22) 
Without an accompanying series of counter-genealogical interruptions, any genealogy proffered, in 
other words, is implicated in precisely the politics of ontological totalisation and closure which 
underpin the historical or political phenomena genealogical counter-writing seeks to challenge. In 
attending to these second- and third-level critiques—of the alternative narrative and the narrator, 
respectively—deconstruction thus enacts a further form of onto-political resistance. This neither 
serves to undermine or destroy such interventions, nor does it entail the immobilisation of the 
subject; rather, it insists upon critique and reflexivity at the same moment as political interventions 
are being constructed and enacted. 
In insisting on these second- and third-order critiques in addition to the original act of counter-
writing, deconstruction can be framed as a ‘principle of interminable analysis: an axiom of 
interminability, perhaps’ (Derrida, 1998, p. 33). Simply put, the deconstructive imperative amounts 
to a commitment to disrupting processes of conceptual or ontological unification wherever they 
occur, whether within institutions of global ordering or within one's own discourse; for Derrida, if 
there were a sole thesis of deconstruction ‘it would pose divisibility: difference as divisibility’; 
because ‘there is no indivisible element or simple origin … analysis is interminable’ (1998, pp. 33–
34). In its commitment to ceaselessly unpicking the apparent internal coherence of prevailing forces 
of material and conceptual ordering, which are at work within one's own attempts to enact 
resistance as much as within concrete processes of global politics, deconstruction performs a 
‘hyperanalyticism’: it amounts to ‘a hyperbolicism of analysis that takes sometimes, in certain 
people's eyes, the form of hyperdiabolicism’ (1998, p. 29). 
Such a hyperanalytic mode of engagement is both paradoxical and crucial because, 
in order to prevent the critique of originarism in its transcendental or ontological, analytic or 
dialectical form from yielding, according to the law that we well know, to empiricism or 
positivism, it was necessary to accede, in a still more radical, more analytical fashion, to the 
traditional demand, to the very law which had just been deconstructed. (1998, p. 29) 
In other words, deconstruction paradoxically mobilises the very analytical and conceptual tools 
which it itself has already identified as divisible and deconstructible in order to challenge both these 
tools and resist the traditions of thought and praxis they derive from. For Bowman, deconstruction 
thus amounts to a process of ‘literalisation’; it simply looks for ‘that which is claimed or assumed to 
be real, present, actual or true (such as the notions of presence, justice, responsibility, univocal 
truth, etc). In looking, it reveals that these are both undecidable and yet forcefully imposed, in 
contingent constitutional forms’ (Bowman, 2010, p. 39). But it insists that such looking be constantly 
undertaken both at the level of processes of global ordering and within one's own attempts to enact 
resistance to such ordering. The radicalism of such an extensive critical imperative is suggested by 
Adorno: such thought 
as such, before all particular contents, is an act of negation, of resistance to that which is 
forced upon it; this is what thought has inherited from its archetype, the relation between 
labor and material… The effort implied in the concept of thought itself, as a counterpart to 
passive contemplation, is negative already – a revolt against being importuned to bow to 
every immediate thing. (2004, p. 19) 
As this suggests, the reason such second- and third-order resistances are necessary relates to the 
question of violence. 
Deconstruction attempts to render explicit and address the violence which is immanent to political 
thought and praxis as such. In Adorno's terms, 
[w]hile doing violence to the object of its synthesis, our thinking heeds a potential that waits 
in the object, and it unconsciously obeys the idea of making amends to the pieces for what it 
has done… [T]he resistance of thought to mere things in being, the commanding freedom of 
the subject, intends in the object even that of which the object was deprived by its 
objectification. (2004, p. 19)6 
What this means is that a form of resistance which comprises second- and third-order critiques, as 
opposed to a single gesture of supposedly correct intervention, can better attend to, expose, and 
attempt to ameliorate the violent exclusions that necessarily accompany it. 
A prevailing response to such a deconstructive imperative has been to insist that radical politics 
requires ‘constructive’, positive interventions and activities, not an endless picking apart of these; as 
Noys relays, it is claimed that ‘the micro-politics of deconstruction can never pass to a constructive 
stage of building or creating radical alternatives…’ (2012, p. 29). It is assumed in this reading, in 
other words, that deconstruction amounts to fruitless process of undermining intervention and a 
cyclical pattern of disruption which ultimately leads nowhere. On the contrary, however, these 
movements are precisely productive and generative of substantive political interventions; much as 
when an issue or concept is discussed in a classroom without ultimate resolution, or a text read 
which challenges one's views without offering an immediate ready solution, the consequence of a 
deconstructive engagement is not stasis and silence, but rather a sparking of fresh reflections, a 
rethinking and reimagining which itself amounts and makes possible further generative and 
productive acts, even if the ground upon which one bases such interventions has become decidedly 
shakier. Consequently, far from ineffectual, deconstruction is ‘the act of taking a position, in the very 
work it does with regard to the political-institutional structures that constitute and govern our 
practices, our competences, and our performances’ (Derrida, cited in Elam, 1994, p. 90). It remains 
to provide some specific examples of such deconstructive political praxis. 
 
Deconstruction as Political Praxis 
There are many manifestations of the practical consequences of deconstructive resistance across a 
range of academic disciplines and activist sites. Drawing on the work of scholars and activists who 
have explicitly linked their radical political projects to deconstruction, whether through endorsing or 
critiquing it, this section provides two accounts of deconstruction read as a form of activism, 
followed by a brief snapshot of three examples of its praxiological utility in the contexts of feminist, 
queer, and post-colonial political interventions. Crucially, I am not trying to claim for deconstruction 
the successes of these latter movements, nor am I suggesting that the actors involved by any means 
do or should self-identify as proponents of deconstruction. To do so would be a crude and colonising 
appropriation. Rather, the point made is that the movements and interventions discussed share with 
deconstruction a commitment to disrupting prevailing norms and assumptions reflective of the 
second- and third-order critiques outlined above, specifically as regards problematising essentialised 
or naturalised agents of resistance. 
One pertinent account of the concrete consequences of deconstruction is provided by Martin 
McQuillan. He suggests it can be conceptualised as a form of ‘textual activism’: in deconstruction's 
movements, he argues, ‘an intervention takes place (a textual activism) which produces the 
movement, history and becoming of a necessary political analysis which links the political to critical 
thought today’ (2008, p. 6). This is because 
deconstruction (unlike philosophy) reads. Such reading qua reading does not generalise from 
the exemplary but accepts the challenge of the exemplary to thought as an articulation of 
the troubling otherness which presents itself as an arrival in reading. Reading in this sense 
has very little to do with the quiet spaces of university libraries… Rather, this reading is an 
interminable, unconditional critical liveliness to the world around us, its histories and its 
futures. (2008, p. 6–7) 
In elucidating this notion of textual activism, McQuillan makes the point that deconstruction 
intervenes not simply at the level of thought or philosophy but rather in ways which have 
substantive material effects. Simply put, this is because the ways we think have a direct bearing on 
the ways we act; in the post-9/11 world, 
the stupefaction and mystification of domestic thought is inseparable from the military 
violence which is only one aspect of this world-wide struggle. Thus, critical reason and 
deconstruction are more important now than ever and this textual activism will be affiliated 
in unpredictable ways… to the material processes of the political. (2008, p. 9) 
McQuillan emphasises here the extent to which ‘textual’ readings and interventions are by no means 
dissociable from the concrete sphere of global politics. While certainly not their sole origin or source, 
socio-political framings and discourses of war and militarism in the post-9/11 world clearly 
functioned to provide the conceptual foundations and parameters without which the justifications 
proffered by statespersons in the USA and elsewhere for the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan could 
not have been convincing or indeed intelligible. Many scholars of global politics using Derrida's 
thought have made similar points in a range of empirical contexts (Arfi, 2012; Bulley, 2009; Edkins, 
1999; Fagan, Glorieux, Hašimbegović, & Suetsugu, 2007; Zehfuss, 2002). 
Concurrently, Paul Bowman frames deconstruction as a form of ‘martial art’. He suggests that 
‘although Derrida mainly read and wrote (monstrously faithfully) about “mere” philosophical texts, 
these texts are to be understood as “indices of real history”, produced by and productive of 
particular biases: effects that have effects’ (2010, p. 38). This analogy emerges in part from the 
embeddedness of deconstruction in relations of violence: it is ‘construed as responding to 
challenges, intimately attentive, listening, sticking, yielding, inverting and displacing, always patient, 
calm and adaptive’ (2010, p. 40) in a manner reflective of martial arts, particularly t'ai chi. Bowman 
elaborates on parallel misreadings of deconstruction and t'ai chi as ‘philosophical, isolated, inward-
looking, navel-gazing: as not really real’; both are framed as ‘digressions away from reality, truth, 
and direct, practical engagement’ (2010, p. 41). However, like t'ai chi, deconstruction has, he 
demonstrates, a series of concrete praxiological implications. For instance, deconstruction makes 
possible a form of engagement with political antagonists which emphasises ‘listening’: in contrast to 
simply denouncing and dismissing interlocutors, deconstruction ‘listens by sticking to the other… 
Derrida listened, stuck and yielded to the texts and institutions of philosophy, in order to invert and 
displace conceptual orders and foci’ (2010, p. 44). Bowman suggests that in academic contexts, this 
might mean, for instance, seeking to publish in journals other than those reflecting one's own 
disciplinary and ethico-political commitments, dealing with difference in terms and contexts other 
than the familiar. 
The practical consequences of such deconstructive resistance can be seen in a host of political sites. 
To take the example, first, of feminist political struggles, Diane Elam, for instance, suggests that 
feminism and deconstruction can usefully be read alongside each another because, 
[o]n the one hand, feminism shifts the ground of the political, interrogating the opposition 
between the public and the private spheres. On the other hand, deconstruction displaces 
our understanding of how theory relates to practice by rethinking the opposition of 
philosophical reflection to political action. (1994, p. 1) 
Elam connects the rise of deconstruction to the rise of third-wave feminism, posing the question: 
‘must feminism always seek to erase difference by giving birth to a family of identical daughters who 
all fight for the same causes, who all pretend to share the same feminist goals? (1994, p. 73). In 
third-wave feminism's de-essentialisation of the category ‘woman’, forms of intervention which 
insist upon the inclusion of race, class, age, ethnicity, and sexuality in the forms of intervention they 
proffer have emerged, something which, as Elam shows, has hugely important consequences for 
issues such as the representation of women in institutions of government, abortion, past 
configurations of conjugal rights, gay marriage, and the gendered and Westerncentric writing of 
history, psychoanalysis, and philosophy. 
To the anxieties espoused by those worried that problematising the category ‘woman’ spells disaster 
for the feminist project, Elam replies: 
this is not the same thing as being condemned to the land of relativistic nihilism, where 
political action—or any action for that matter—becomes impossible. Uncertainty… is neither 
an absolute obstacle to action nor a theoretical bar to political praxis. (1994, p. 31) 
Such interventionism is reflected in Elam's formulation of the notion of ‘groundless solidarity’, a 
form of solidarity ‘which is not based on identity’ but relies rather upon ‘a coalition built around 
suspicion of identity as the essential grounding for meaningful political action’ (1994, p. 69). She 
suggests, in short, that ‘the gains of feminism have produced a situation in which the meta-narrative 
of the affirmation of female identity has foundered precisely because its realization can only be 
imperialist'. Consequently, she continues, feminism and deconstruction work similarly towards 
challenging such essentialism: such an endeavour entails ‘endless work, an abyssal politics…’ (1994, 
p. 120). This example shows how the problematisation of foundational claims about sex and gender 
has lead not to the death of feminism but rather to a form of feminism committed to interrogating 
its own past and present exclusions and violences such that it can better resist (although by no 
means entirely avoid) reperforming conventional forms of onto-political ordering in its theoretical 
and concrete interventions. 
Concurrently, in the context of queer activism and queer theory, Joshua Gamson explores the 
controversies which ensued following the announcement made in San Francisco that the 1993 pride 
celebrations were to be named the ‘Year of the Queer’. For many, the signifier ‘queer’, Gamson 
shows, ‘shakes the ground on which gay and lesbian politics has been built[,]… haphazardly 
attempting to build a politics from the rubble of deconstructed collective categories’ (1995, p. 390). 
From this, Gamson notes, a series of dilemmas emerge regarding ‘for whom, when, and how are 
stable collective identities necessary for social action and social change?… When and how might 
deconstructive strategies take aim at institutional forms [of oppression]’. What occurred in the shift 
towards embracing the signifier ‘queer’, he suggests, was a process of de-essentialisation, the very 
fracturing nature of which was politically salutary: 
Queer movements pose the challenge of a form of organizing in which, far from inhibiting 
accomplishments, the destabilization of collective identity is itself a goal and 
accomplishment of collective action. When this dynamic is taken into account, new 
questions arise. (Gamson, 1995, p. 403, emphasis in original) 
As Gamson shows, the integration of transgender and bisexual issues into the sphere of debate 
represents a concrete effect of such a process of de-essentialisation. Thus, in challenging the 
contours and parameters of subject of resistance, the queer movement displays an imperative 
similar to the generative effects of a deconstructive mode of resistance. 
To turn, finally, to post-colonial politics, Michael Syrotinski has explored what he frames as the 
‘uneasy encounter between deconstruction and the postcolonial’ (2007, p. 2). He argues that for 
some, such as Robert Young, ‘Derrida's work has always, even if somewhat indirectly, challenged the 
ethico-political tensions at the heart of colonialist ideology’ (2007, p. 11). For Alberto Moreiras, the 
two traditions, Syrotinski notes, share the view that ‘in order to wrest the possibility of a political 
affirmation from its continual foreclosure, we require a double articulation, akin to Spivak's 
“strategic essentialism” and Derrida's “double inscription”’ (2007, p. 36). For others, however, he 
continues, Derrida ‘is ultimately a representative of the Western philosophical tradition he is 
deconstructing, and… deconstruction is therefore at best a-political and a-historical, and at worst 
complicitous with a certain theoretical imperialism’ (2007, p. 12). This raises the question of the 
Eurocentric and colonising dimensions of deconstructive thought itself. In particular, as Mustapha 
Pasha, amongst others, has shown, there is a danger in many prevailing critical-theoretical traditions 
that the insistence of putting into relief all forms of individual and collective identity in a similar 
manner assumes a general condition of post-foundational subjectivity and its consequences, a move 
which effaces other onto-political configurations (2011; 2013). As a form of engagement based on 
problematising its own as well as others’ interventions, deconstruction can and must respond to its 
own violences, exclusions, and reinscriptions of hierarchy, and view such critique as a matter of 
urgency. In insisting on second- and third-order critiques, deconstruction impels its agent to pursue 
forms of auto-critique which problematise such potential colonialisms to the fullest extent possible, 
which is to say interminably, and without final resolution. 
To restate, I am emphatically not suggesting that the radical political changes associated with third-
wave feminism, queer movements, or post-colonial politics can or should be subsumed within, or be 
conceived of as derivative of or synonymous with, Derrida's thought or deconstruction as a 
philosophical tradition. Rather, the claim made is that the sites of political intervention mentioned 
here share with deconstruction, as I have framed it in this paper, a commitment to attempting to 
resist the hierarchies and exclusions associated with of prevailing forms of ordering by disrupting 
apparently stable categories and assumptions, in particular as regards problematising the subject or 
agent of resistance herself. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has argued that there are a series of ways in which deconstruction contains the potential 
to resist resistance's cooptation back into interrelated processes of conceptual and global ordering. 
Such a form of resistance can be framed as occurring at three interconnected registers. First, as 
Eagleton's account of its pursuit of ‘every smug concept’ suggests, deconstruction's radicalism 
consists in its resistance to the possibility, or rather its highlighting of the violence of any claim to the 
possibility, of asserting defensibly that a particular issue or problem is not of concern or falls 
‘outside’ the bounds of one's responsibility. Inasmuch as deconstruction highlights violence, its 
imperative is to identify and disrupt processes of totalisation wherever they occur. That one cannot 
attend to even a fraction of such processes adequately does not absolve one of this responsibility; 
this state of affairs comprises only a further layer of violence for which one cannot atone. Any claims 
to legitimate borders which demarcate the limits of responsibility are themselves subject to 
deconstructive reflection, and their necessarily forceful imposition demonstrated thereby. Such an 
intervention proceeds on the basis that responsibility is limitless, following the logic of both 
Emmanuel Levinas and Derrida. The all-too-common refusal of such limitless responsibility is thereby 
called into question, and all possible justifications exposed as indefensible. As such, the urgency of 
political intervention is reemphasised. 
As this suggests, second, a deconstructive engagement is radically, if paradoxically, politicising. 
When the possibility of being finally ‘correct’ or ‘just’ is removed in the context of the subject's 
political deliberations, that is, when it is acknowledged that one's political interventions are 
inexorably violent, that one can only choose between violence and violence, the subject is obliged to 
consider the very difficult question of what s/he would intervene for or against, whether in concrete 
political practice or more conceptually, in spite of its ultimate indefensibility. Far from resulting in 
immobilisation or fatalistic resignation, this encounter with the indefensible can serve to allow the 
subject to encounter the violence of his/her position and commit to it nevertheless. That no position 
can be ultimately unproblematically correct does not mean that ‘anything goes’ or that ‘nothing 
matters’; rather, this aporetic condition means that the course of action one chooses (because one 
always chooses, even, and especially, if one attempts to evade the taking of a position) must be 
argued for, defended, and reflected upon constantly in light of new ideas and encounters. 
Furthermore, this condition entails that the responsibility for the subject's position rests with her 
alone, rather than being legitimated in advance by some external principle. This has a denaturalising 
and politicising effect on positions taken, making possible a radical shaking up of notions once 
assumed to be essential or universal. It is to this that Derrida points when he notes that 
deconstruction ‘is too political for some people, can seem paralyzing to those who only recognize 
politics with the help of pre-war slogans’ (cited in Elam, 1994, p. 90). 
Consequently, the radical potential of deconstruction consists, third, in the extent to which it 
intervenes at the level of conscious and unconscious processes of subject-production and 
reproduction. The question of the subject of resistance is explored by Eagleton, who suggests that 
deconstruction ultimately precludes the possibility of a functional and effective revolutionary 
subjectivity: it preserves ‘some of the dominant themes of traditional bourgeois liberalism by a 
desperate, last-ditch strategy: by sacrificing the subject itself, at least in any of its customary modes'. 
The subject is consequently rendered ‘impotent as any kind of agent at all, least of all a revolutionary 
one’ (1981, p. 138). In contrast to this reading, Derrida suggests that ‘a deconstructionist approach 
to the boundaries that institute human subjectivity… [can] lead to reinterpretation of the whole 
apparatus of boundaries within which a history and culture have been able to confine their 
criteriology’ (1992, p. 19); as such, it is precisely the ‘customary modes’ of subjecthood identified by 
Eagleton that Derrida seeks to problematise. 
At the heart of Derrida's intervention is the suggestion that prevailing Western modes of 
subjectification themselves are not innocent as regards contemporary concrete ethico-political 
problems, and that resistances to onto-political totalisations can emanate from challenging such 
processes at the level of one's subjecthood. The question that arises here is whether such a 
challenge to conventional forms of subjectivity amounts to a ‘sacrifice’, as Eagleton argues, or rather 
a politically salient attempt to reflect upon and intervene in the process of subjectification and 
identity-production and reproduction, as Derrida suggests. For Eagleton, insofar as the subject itself 
become implicated in and destabilised as a consequence of deconstruction, the price one pays ‘is the 
highest of all: death’ (1981, p. 136). He explains: 
Deconstruction is the death drive at the level of theory: in dismembering a text, it turns its 
violence masochistically upon itself and goes down with it, locked with its object in a lethal 
complicity that permits it the final inviolability of pure negation. The deconstructionist 
nothing lieth because he nothing affirmeth. (1981, p. 136–7) 
Yet, he continues, such death is not final because metaphysics will live on; similarly deconstruction, 
as a ‘living' death, will regroup its forces to assault anew. Each agonist is ever-slain and ever-
resurrected; the compulsion to repeat, to refight a battle in which antagonist can never be 
destroyed because he is always everywhere and nowhere, to struggle towards a (self)-killing 
that will never quite come, is the dynamic of deconstruction… [D]econstruction is kept alive 
by what contaminates it, and can therefore reap the pleasures of a possible self-dissolution 
which, as one form of invulnerability, is mirrored by another, the fact that it can never die 
because the enemy is within and unkillable. (1981, p. 137) 
In short, in this reading deconstruction is self-defeating; it comprises a form of intervention which 
renders it, and its subject, highly vulnerable to its own violent gestures whilst ensuring it, and its 
subject, live on to continue this masochistic process ad infinitum. Key here is the notion that a 
certain pleasure is derived from such self-annihilation; Eagleton concludes that ‘the moment in 
which all of this occurs is of course the moment of jouissance or petite mort’ (1981, p. 137). 
The crucial question thus emerges of whether such a radical ‘emptying out’ effects anything 
politically salient, or whether it simply results in catatonic self-torturing/pleasuring at the precipice 
of a self-styled abyss. In contrast to Eagleton's reading, in the spirit of a more Derridean (and, on a 
different day, Nietzschean) tone, I would suggest that such a death only follows if the subject is 
construed in a particular Cartesian manner. To the degree that it insists upon second- and third-
order critiques—of alternative narratives proffered and of the author of such re-writings herself—in 
addition to initial challenges to processes of conceptual and political ordering, deconstruction aims 
to ‘put consciousness into question in its assured certainty of itself’ (Derrida, 1982, p. 17), and in so 
doing, following gestures made by, amongst others, Nietzsche, Freud, Heidegger and Lacan, to begin 
to think the possibility of post-foundational forms of subjectivity. Eagleton objects to this on the 
basis that Derrida's thought 
ignores the extent to which a certain provisional stability of identity is essential not only for 
psychical well-being but for revolutionary political agency. It contains no adequate theory of 
such agency, since the subject would now seem no more than the decentered effect of the 
semiotic process; and its valuable attention to the split, precarious, pluralistic nature of all 
identity slides at worst into an irresponsible hymning of the virtues of schizophrenia. 
Political revolution becomes, in effect, equivalent to carnivalesque delirium… (1991, p. 197–
8) 
In this reading, such self-referentiality and fracturing precisely serves the interests of forces of global 
ordering insofar as a subject possessing particular, if provisional, certitudes about itself and socio-
political orientation is necessary for radical political intervention and resistance. I would suggest, in 
contrast, that to the extent that the micro-workings of ordering occur simultaneously at the level of 
the material and within the subject, learning to explore the ways in which one is formed and 
reformed in light of processes of global and inter-personal ordering can comprise a crucial site of 
political resistance. This is, of course, not to suggest that one can finally identify and thereby 
renounce such processes, but rather that within the confines of these one can attempt to unpick 
parts of oneself such that elements of such micro-gestures of ordering and subject-(re)production 
become at least partially identifiable and interpretable. This reflects closely, for instance, ongoing 
feminist and post-colonial calls for the interrogation of patriarchal and colonial logics at work at the 
level of thought, consciousness, and language, the invisible micro-violences which undergird 
concrete political violences. For Hoy, such an intervention amounts to ‘proposing a different moral 
psychology’ (2004, p.180). Such a process entails that the subject take itself as well as its political 
locale as the object to be resisted; attempting to elucidate the ways which one is always constructed 
as part of, and therefore complicit in, that which one seeks to resist can be, somewhat paradoxically, 
a gesture of both defiance and agency. 
Part of the radicalism of such a deconstructive mode of engagement is its defiance of the licence so 
central to prevailing forms of subjecthood cultivated with contemporary Western societies of the 
right to ‘look away’, to read lives, or tacitly accept scripting of lives, as being of differing value, of 
tolerating and sanctioning hierarchies of grievability and mournability (Butler, 2004). In a cultural 
context which accepts and encourages ignorance of and indifference to one's embeddedness in 
relations of violence, deconstruction can enact a form of resistance by insisting on looking, thinking, 
and feeling in sites of acute discomfort from which it would be easier to turn away. In this sense, 
deconstruction takes seriously Nietzsche's call for political subjects who are ‘inquisitive to a fault, 
investigators to the point of cruelty, with unhesitating fingers for the intangible, with teeth and 
stomachs for the most indigestible’ (1997, p. 32), subjects endeavouring to resist the violences of 
onto-political consolidation in the spheres of the material, the philosophical, and the recesses of 
their own subjecthood. 
 
Notes 
1 Concrete examples of this are too numerous to mention any but a few: one would be the 
prevalence of highly problematic gender politics as seen in many activist sites for instance, in the 
recent scandals surrounding the occurrence and handling of sexual assault and rapes within the 
Socialist Workers Party in the UK; another, the transphobia and colonialisms rife in many feminist 
organisations in Europe and the USA; a third, the widespread use of militarised imagery, clothing, 
and vocabularies utilised in many anti-militarist organisations. Specific examples of these will be 
discussed below. While I am not intending to draw a clear line between acts of resistance and acts 
which are re-entangled into propping up prevailing forms of global ordering—to do so would be 
neither possible nor desirable—what I am suggesting is that there is a widespread problem within 
radical sites, both within and beyond the academy, in that the reproduction of certain violences is 
ignored. This, in my view, amounts to at least a partial reinscription of the forms of resistance 
proffered in these spaces back into normalised forms exclusion and hierarchy characteristic of 
current of global ordering. 
2 In invoking the notion of ‘concrete’ here, I am anticipating the criticism that such an auto-
deconstructionist mode of resistance remains abstracted and removed from ‘real world’ or 
‘material’ intervention. As will be demonstrated below, the realms of thought and action, or theory 
and practice, are by no means distinct, the one having a direct bearing on the other. 
3 The question of ‘affirmationism’ in contemporary radical thought has been skilfully interrogated by 
Noys (2012). Further discussion of this important critique is, unfortunately, beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
4 This is to be understood figuratively as a shorthand for indicating the (post)Enlightenment 
exposure of a certain abyss in which stable onto-political foundations and grounds were 
fundamentally undermined, rather than as a claim that religion has ceased to play a crucial role in 
contemporary political life. For discussion of this see the Forum entitled ‘International Politics and 
the “Death of God”', in Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 42 (1). 
5 The problems of the romanticism of this are important for what follows; such a framing is ripe for a 
deconstructive analysis itself. 
6 There is much more to be said regarding the intersections and parallels between Derrida's 
deconstruction and Adorno's ‘negative dialectics’, in particular their different framings of the 
relationship between the subject and object of thought. This is, however, unfortunately beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
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